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1Abstract
It has long been recognized that the quality of property rights
greatly impacts the economic development of a country and the use
of its natural resources. Since Long (1975), the conventional wisdom
has been that ownership risk induces a ﬁrm to overuse the stock of
a resource. However, the empirical evidence is mixed. In particu-
lar, Bohn and Deacon (2000) ﬁnds that weak property rights have
an ambiguous eﬀect on present extraction. We provide a theoretical
model supporting these mixed observations in a common-pool resource
environment. We show that if ownership risk includes a risk of expro-
priation in which the identities of the excluded ﬁrms are unknown
ex ante, then the present extraction of all ﬁrms may decrease along
with a higher risk of expropriation. The elasticity of demand for the
resource is key in explaining the eﬀect of ownership risk on present
extraction.
Keywords: Common-pool resource, Expropriation, Extraction be-
havior, Ownership risk, Property rights, Tragedy of the commons.
JEL Classiﬁcations: D21, D23, D92, Q30.
21 Introduction
It has long been recognized that the quality of property rights greatly impacts
the economic development of a country and the use of its natural resources.
The issue of property rights is particularly relevant in the resource sector
because numerous resource-rich countries have weak property rights due to
unreliable judicial systems and/or unstable political environment. Since Long
(1975), the conventional wisdom has been that ownership risk induces a ﬁrm
to overuse the stock of a resource.1 Speciﬁcally, a higher risk of expropriation
decreases the marginal return of exploiting the stock in the future, which
raises present extraction.2 In other words, increasing the risk of expropriation
causes the future return from maintaining the stock to be discounted more
heavily, which leads to disinvestment. This explanation has been supported
by empirical evidence, notably Jacoby et al. (2002).3
An empirical study by Bohn and Deacon (2000) challenges this vision.
Using cross-country data compiled from various sources, weaker property
rights are shown to have an ambiguous eﬀect on the use of natural resources.
In particular, weaker property rights reduces the current extraction for re-
sources such as petroleum and mining that need large up-front expenditure
in capital goods. This is because higher ownership risk deters the large up-
front expenditures necessary to exploit the resource, which, in turn, reduces
present extraction.4 However, one can wonder why countries such as Bolivia,
Venezuela, or Russia have managed to attract large amounts of foreign-direct
investment (FDI) in petroleum and mining despite a history of nationaliza-
tion and expropriation of foreign interests in these sectors (Kobrin, 1984;
1Weak property rights and ownership risk are used interchangeably in the text. Both
terms refer to the uncertainty about the agreements between a country and the ﬁrms
regarding the exploitation of a natural resource.
2Expropriation may refer not only to the physical exclusion of the ﬁrm, but also to the
appropriation of some of the proﬁts generated from the exploitation of the resource.
3Using household data from northeast China, Jacoby et al. (2002) study the link be-
tween investment in fertilizer use and land tenure insecurity induced by China’s system of
village-level land reallocation. They show that a higher risk of expropriation signiﬁcantly
reduces private long run investments.
4Note that the explanation put forth by Bohn and Deacon (2000) is related to Farzin
(1984) and Lasserre (1985) which show that a higher discount rate leads to lower current
extraction if the extraction process is suﬃciently capital-intensive.
3Kennedy, 1993). More generally, using a panel data of 42 developing coun-
tries for the 1993-2006 period, Hajzler (2008) shows that countries viewed
as more likely to expropriate (having expropriated in the recent past) also
have a disproportionate share of FDI in the resource sector, even for the
resources asking for large up-front expenditures. In other words, investment
in countries with a high risk of expropriation is not only large, but it is also
larger than in countries with a low risk of expropriation. Speciﬁcally, the av-
erage share of resources in total FDI is higher among recently expropriating
countries in comparison to non-expropriating countries, even if expropriating
countries are not especially resource-dependent (Hajzler, 2008).5
We provide a theoretical model supporting these mixed observations in a
traditional common-pool resource environment. We show that if ownership
risk includes a risk of expropriation in which the identities of the excluded
ﬁrms are unknown ex ante, then present extraction may decrease along with
a higher risk of expropriation. To see why, consider a small group of ﬁrms
that are presently exploiting a resource in a politically unstable country. The
anticipation of a sudden change in the agreement with the expropriation of
some of the ﬁrms has an ambiguous eﬀect on future proﬁts. While the exclu-
sion of a ﬁrm reduces its own future proﬁts to zero, the exclusion of some of
the other ﬁrms increases future proﬁts due to less competition in extracting
the resource. Hence, a higher risk of expropriation has two eﬀects on the
behavior of a ﬁrm through its anticipated payoﬀs. On the one hand, a ﬁrm
has a higher incentive to extract the resource now due to a lower chance of
reaping the future reward if aﬀected by expropriation. On the other hand,
a ﬁrm has a higher incentive to manage the resource in the long run due
to a chance of facing less competition if it happens that the other ﬁrms are
expropriated. These two incentives work in opposite direction, and, thus,
the overall eﬀect of weaker property rights on behavior depends on their re-
spective strength: if the expected gain from less competition outweighs the
5Note that, due to the unobservability of other terms of the agreements that could have
oﬀset expropriation risks, we cannot unambiguously state exactly how larger FDI would
have been in each country with a lower expropriation risk. However, these examples and
results provide a motivation to oﬀer an alternative explanation that does not rely on the
capital intensity of extraction resource.
4expected loss from being expropriated, then present extraction decreases in
response to weaker property rights. Two stylized facts support our expla-
nation. First, the resource extraction sector is mainly a sector with a few
extracting ﬁrms (Salant, 1976; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1981; Hartwick and
Sadorsky, 1990), which is prone to the tragedy of the common (Tornell and
Velasco, 1992; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Van der Ploeg, 2010). Second, there
are very few massive expropriations in which all the ﬁrms extracting a com-
mon resource are expropriated at the same time. In 42 developing countries,
from 1989 to 2006, 77% of episodes of expropriations aﬀected only one ﬁrm.
Data from Hajzler (2008).
In order to embed formally the uncertainty in the number of ﬁrms ex-
ploiting a common resource, it is necessary to depart from the traditional
single-ﬁrm framework used in the literature (Long, 1975; Bohn and Deacon,
2000). Therefore, we study the question of ownership risk in an inﬁnite-
horizon dynamic game with two ﬁrms earning a proﬁt from the exploitation
of a common and nonrenewable resource.6 Each ﬁrm is a monopolist in the
sale of the resource, but competes with one another in the exploitation of
the resource. Hence, the eﬀect of a ﬁrm on the other ﬁrm’s payoﬀs is real-
ized through the evolution of the stock. In other words, there is a dynamic
externality leading to the tragedy of the commons.7
The exploitation of the resource is governed by an agreement between
a country and the two ﬁrms. The agreement deﬁnes the identities of the
active ﬁrms allowed to exploit the resource, as well as the cost of extraction
6Absent expropriation, extraction activities are usually long-term projects. The game
can be solved recursively for large ﬁnite horizons as well. The limit of the solution for
the t-period game as t goes to inﬁnity is the solution to the inﬁnite-horizon game that we
consider. See Levhari and Mirman (1980) for a canonical example. The important point
is that our explanation (i.e., if ownership risk includes a risk of expropriation in which
the identities of the excluded ﬁrms are unknown ex ante, then present extraction may
decrease along with a higher risk of expropriation) is robust to the horizon of the game.
However, given the speciﬁcation of the game, shorter horizons reinforce the negative eﬀect
of ownership risk on present extraction. Hence, the inﬁnite horizon provides the weakest
conditions for which a higher risk of ownership leads to a lower present extraction.
7In order to obtain a clear exposition of the mechanism at work, we abstract from
the interaction of the two ﬁrms in the resale market. We later show in Section 4 and
Appendix C that our results are robust to a model in which ﬁrms also interact in the
resale market.
5rights for each active ﬁrm. The country has weak property rights because
the agreement is subject to a one-time change. The probability of a change
in the agreement is exogenous and known to all ﬁrms. The sudden change
in the agreement can lead to the expropriation of one of the ﬁrms (so that
the remaining ﬁrm no longer faces a dynamic externality) or the unilateral
increase in the cost of extraction rights or both.8 While ownership risk has
two components, the change in the cost of extraction rights applies to both
ﬁrms, while the exclusion aﬀects at most one ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, a higher risk
of exclusion means that there is a higher probability that one of the two ﬁrms
be excluded, although the identity of the excluded ﬁrm is unknown ex ante.
Note that we do not look at appropriation games in which powerful groups
can inﬂuence the ﬁscal process and redistribute the economy-wide capital
stock among themselves (Tornell and Velasco, 1992; Tornell and Lane, 1999)
or at contracting games between the ﬁrms and the government. As in Long
(1975) and Bohn and Deacon (2000), our paper focuses on the eﬀect of an
exogenous ownership risk on behavior of ﬁrms. Considering an endogenous
property right environment is outside of the scope of this paper. See Hotte
et al. (2000) for a recent contribution on this topic.
After characterizing the behavior of the ﬁrms in the symmetric Markov-
perfect equilibrium, we study the eﬀect of ownership risk on the present
exploitation of the resource. Our results can be summarized as follows. First,
if there is no risk of expropriation, then a higher likelihood of a unilateral
increase in the cost of extraction rights (in the form of a higher share of proﬁt
retained by the country) induces all the ﬁrms to extract more in the present.
This result is a generalization to games of the risk of expropriation studied
8Considering both sources of ownership risk is relevant with regard to what happens
in practice. For example, Venezuela used both during its history of nationalization. Over
the years, there has been signiﬁcant increases in the income tax rate applicable to the oil
activity as well as the approval of additional surcharge taxes. These taxes increased from
about 50% in the forties and ﬁfties to a maximum of 94% in the seventies (Monaldi, 2008).
During the privatization wave in the nineties, royalty rates had been reduced to a mere 1%
of revenues for many foreign ﬁrms. In 2004, these royalties were increased to 16% of the
beneﬁts and in 2006 these royalties represented up to 50% of the beneﬁts. Regarding the
exclusion of ﬁrms, Exxon and several other foreign companies have recently had their assets
seized by the Venezuelan state: at least $1.7 billion in mining and petroleum investments
has been expropriated between 2001 and 2006.
6in a single-ﬁrm framework by Long (1975) and Bohn and Deacon (2000).9
Second, the risk of expropriation yields an ambiguous eﬀect on present
extraction regardless of the presence of the risk of a higher cost of extraction
rights. That is, a higher probability that one of the two ﬁrms be excluded in
the future might decrease present extraction for both ﬁrms. The direction of
this eﬀect depends on the elasticity of demand. The key role of the elasticity
of demand is related to the tragedy of the commons.10 Speciﬁcally, a higher
elasticity of demand exacerbates the tragedy of the commons, i.e., the nega-
tive impact of the dynamic externality on proﬁts increases on the elasticity of
demand. In other words, while an increase in demand elasticity increases ex-
traction for both a single ﬁrm and a group of competing ﬁrms, the diﬀerence
is increasing in the elasticity of demand. Therefore, in a situation of a strong
tragedy of the commons (due to a high elasticity of demand), the expected
gain from less competition outweighs the expected loss from being expro-
priated, which decreases present extraction when ownership risk increases.11
However, for low values of the elasticity of demand yielding a weak tragedy
of the commons, the marginal loss of being excluded is the strongest eﬀect.
Thus, both ﬁrms increase extraction as ownership risk increases.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present
the model and characterize the dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In Sec-
tion 3, we study the eﬀect of ownership risk on optimal behavior. Section 4
concludes.
9Our model encompasses the extreme case of a nationalization of the natural resource
and a full expropriation of both ﬁrms when the cost of extraction rights after the sudden
change in the agreement is such that the entire proﬁts of the ﬁrms are retained by the
country.
10See Koulovatianos and Mirman (2007) for the role of the elasticity of demand regarding
the eﬀect of externalities on the behavior of the ﬁrms.
11This is akin to an intertemporal third degree price discrimination in a monopolistic
market. Indeed, as the price elasticity becomes larger in future, it is more proﬁtable to
extract less now and charge a higher price in order to shift more of the extraction to the
future. We thank an anonymous referee for this point.
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2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a country in which two ﬁrms earn a proﬁt from the exploitation
of a common and nonrenewable resource. The exploitation of the resource
is governed by an agreement between a country and the two ﬁrms. The
agreement deﬁnes the identities of the active ﬁrms allowed to exploit the
resource, as well as the division of the proﬁt between the country and each
active ﬁrm. Let Ft be the set of active ﬁrms and τt ∈ [0,1] be the share
of proﬁt each active ﬁrm pays to the country at time t. Hence, τt is a tax
and characterizes the cost of extraction rights.12 Assumption 2.1 speciﬁes
the types of agreements the ﬁrms may face.
Assumption 2.1. Ft ∈{ { 1,2},{1},{2}} and τt ∈{ τ,τ}, τ < τ.
At time t, Ft = {1,2} refers to an environment with a dynamic externality
in which ﬁrms 1 and 2 exploit the resource, while Ft = {j} means that ﬁrm
j is allowed to exploit the resource, while ﬁrm k is excluded, k  = j. Under
the initial agreement, both ﬁrms are active and retain a higher share of their
proﬁts, i.e., Ft = {1,2} and τt = τ. Ownership risk is present because the
initial agreement is uncertain and subject to changes in both the cost of
extraction rights as well as the identities of the ﬁrms allowed to exploit the
resource. Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 specify the uncertainty in the agreement.13
The event leading to a change in the initial agreement occurs only once with
known and exogenous probability. The probability distribution of this event
is discrete and time independent, i.e., it does not change with time until
the eviction happens. Once the event occurs, uncertainty disappears for the
remaining periods.14 Moreover, under the new agreement, each ﬁrm has an
equal probability to remain active.
12While the tax is imposed on the proﬁt, it is possible to tax the quantity extracted as
well.
13The tilde distinguishes a random variable from its realization.
14A diﬀerent set up in which the eviction date is certain, but the identity of the excluded
ﬁrm is a random exogenous event retains the same trade-oﬀ we have identiﬁed because each
ﬁrm has the possibility to remain the sole ﬁrm after the eviction date. If the event happens
very soon (or if the discounting is very low), then it is akin to have a high probability of
8Assumption 2.2. For j =1 ,2 and ρ ∈ [0,1], Pr[ ˜ Ft+1 = {j}|Ft = {1,2},τ t =
τ]=ρ/2 and Pr[ ˜ Ft+1 = {j}|Ft = {j}]=P r [˜ Ft+1 = {1,2}|Ft = {1,2},τ t =
τ]=1 .
Assumption 2.3. For j =1 ,2 and α ∈ [0,1], Pr[˜ τt+1 = τ|τt = τ,Ft =
{1,2}]=α and Pr[˜ τt+1 = τ|τt = τ]=P r [ ˜ τt+1 = τ|τt = τ,Ft = {j}]=1 .
A few comments about Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 are warranted. First, the
assumed probability distributions allow us to study several cases of uncer-
tainty in property rights. If ρ>0a n dα = 0, then the uncertainty emanates
only from the number of active ﬁrms. If ρ =0a n dα>0, then the ﬁrms
expect a possible alteration only in the tax levied by the country. Finally,
the case of ρ>0a n dα>0 combines both sources of uncertainty in property
rights. All these cases can then be compared to the benchmark case of no
uncertainty with ρ = α =0 .
Second, our speciﬁcation embeds the case of full expropriation as studied
in the single-ﬁrm framework by Long (1975) and Bohn and Deacon (2000).15
Indeed, ρ =0a n dτ = 1 refers to the situation in which the government
capture all proﬁts, which amounts to an expropriation of all ﬁrms and a
nationalization of the natural resource industry. Here, ρ>0 refers to a
partial expropriation with one ﬁrm excluded and one ﬁrm remaining active
in the industry. As ρ increases, both ﬁrms face a equally higher probability
to be excluded.
Last, the presence of several sources of risk in the agreement has an
ambiguous eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s welfare. For instance, suppose that a political
coup leads to the exclusion of ﬁrm k, while levying a higher tax on the
remaining ﬁrm j, j  = k. While ﬁrm j no longer faces competition in the
exploitation of the resource, it retains less of its proﬁt.
eviction on our model, and if the event happens far in the future (or if the discounting is
very high), then it corresponds to a low probability of exclusion in our set up.
15Note that we ignore the distinction between full expropriation in the sense of taxing all
proﬁts and that of conﬁscating a ﬁrm’s invested capital. The diﬀerence might be reﬂected
in the outside option which we have normalized to zero. Indeed, if all proﬁts are taxed,
then the ﬁrm retains its capital, which translates into a higher value of the outside option.
If invested capital is conﬁscated, then the value of the outside option of the ﬁrm is reduced.
9Having discussed all aspects of the agreement, we now describe the evo-
lution of the stock and the objective function of the ﬁrm.16 The stock of the
resource available to the active ﬁrms at time t is yt. Each period, ﬁrm j ∈F t
extracts a quantity qj,t, which yields a proﬁt π(qj,t)=Pj,tqj,t.T h e c o s t i s
normalized to zero for simplicity. Here, each ﬁrm is always monopolistic in
the market, i.e., Pj,t = q
− 1
η
j,t where η>1 is the elasticity of demand.17 Under
any agreement, (1 − τt)π(qj,t) is retained by the ﬁrm and τtπ(qj,t)i sp a i dt o
the country.
The present overall exploitation by the active ﬁrms has an eﬀect on the
future stock of the common resource. At time t, a total quantity

j∈Ft qj,t
of the resource is extracted and the remaining yt−

j∈Ft qj,t is left for future
exploitation, so that the evolution of the exploited resource follows the rule





We consider the maximization problem of an active ﬁrm in a dynamic inﬁnite-
horizon Cournot-Nash game. Since we restrict attention to stationary Marko-
vian strategies, the problem at hand is time-independent and the subscript
t is dropped hereafter. To distinguish between present and future values,
the prime sign is used. For instance, y and y  are the stock of the resource
today and tomorrow, respectively, while ˜ F  is the random set of active ﬁrms
tomorrow.
Given the stock y, the set of active ﬁrms F, and the cost of extraction
rights, τ, each ﬁrm maximizes the expected sum of discounted proﬁts over
quantities. To that end, each ﬁrm anticipates the eﬀect of his present ex-
ploitation as well as the eﬀect of the other ﬁrm’s output decision on the
future stock of the resource. Moreover, each ﬁrm anticipates the possibility
of an irreversible change in the agreement. Therefore, the value function of
16Koulovatianos and Mirman (2007) use a similar (more general) dynamic framework
to study the eﬀect of market and dynamic externalities on strategies and industry growth.









 , ˜ F
 , ˜ τ
 ), (2)
for 0 ≤ qj ≤ y − qk1[k∈F], k  = j.18 Here, from (1), y  = y − qj − qk1[k∈F] is
the stock of the resource available tomorrow, and the expectation operator
E over the random variables ˜ F  and ˜ τ  conditional on F and τ characterizes
the uncertainty about the agreement. From (2), ﬁrm j faces a dynamic
externality through the evolution of the stock of the resource.
Using Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, we focus on the behavior of the ﬁrms
under the initial agreement. Speciﬁcally, both ﬁrms are presently allowed to
extract the resource and retain more of their proﬁts, i.e., F = {1,2} and






j + δ(1 − ρ)(1 − α)Vj(y − qj − qk,{1,2},τ)
+ δ(1 − ρ)αVj(y − qj − qk,{1,2},τ)
+ δρ(1 − α)Vj(y − qj − qk,{j},τ)/2
+ δραVj(y − qj − qk,{j},τ)/2. (3)
In (3), ﬁrm j anticipates a possible change in the agreement in the subsequent
period. Speciﬁcally, with probability (1−ρ)(1−α), the agreement remains the
same, i.e., both ﬁrms remain active for at least one more period and each ﬁrm
continues to retain a fraction 1 − τ of the proﬁt. With probability (1 − ρ)α,
both ﬁrms remain active, but each ﬁrm retains a lower fraction of the proﬁt.
With probability ρ(1−α)/2, ﬁrm k is excluded, while leaving unchanged the
tax levied on the remaining ﬁrm j. With probability ρα/2, the change in the
agreement leads to the exclusion of ﬁrm k as well as reduces the share of proﬁt
retained by ﬁrm j. Finally, with probability ρ/2, it is ﬁrm j that is excluded
from extracting the resource, i.e., F = {k}, and the anticipated stream of
proﬁts from the alternative activity for ﬁrm j is exogenous and normalized
to zero. Consistent with Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3, once the agreement is
18The indicator function 1[k∈F] is equal to one when k ∈F, and zero otherwise.
11modiﬁed, there are no more anticipated changes in the agreement. In other






j + δVj(y − qj − qk1[k∈F],F,τ), (4)
where {F ,τ } = {F,τ}.
2.3 Dynamic Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
We can now characterize the symmetric dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium
corresponding to (2) under our assumptions.19 Let g(y,F,τ)b eas t a t i o n a r y
Markovian strategy for the present exploitation of the resource. The strategy
proﬁle {g(y,F,τ)}j∈F is a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium if
the maximization problem (2) subject to qk = g(y,F,τ) yields the optimal
solution qj = g(y,F,τ).
In view of (3) and (4), there are four diﬀerent value functions. Proposi-
tion 2.4 provides the four value functions and their corresponding maximiz-
ers.20 In Proposition 2.4, the terms ϕF,τ > 0a n dωF,τ ∈ [0,1/|F|] depend
only on the states F and τ, but not on y. These terms also depend on the
exogenous parameters ρ, α,a n dη.




and the optimal strategy is of the form
g(y,F,τ)=ωF,τy. (6)
19Symmetry of the ﬁrms regarding the cost of extraction rights. Adding more hetero-
geneity in the cost of extraction rights and the probability of being excluded from the new
agreement does not alter the results of the paper. It is in fact through heterogeneity that
the ambiguity of the eﬀect of ownership risk on behavior can be explained.
20The game can be solved recursively for ﬁnite horizons as well. The limit of the solution
for the t-period game as t goes to inﬁnity is the solution to the inﬁnite-horizon game that
we consider. See Levhari and Mirman (1980) for a canonical example.
12The proof is relegated to Appendix A. Here, the cases with one ﬁrm have
closed-form solutions, i.e., for τ ∈{ τ,τ},






and g(y,{j},τ)=( 1− δη)y. The cases with two active ﬁrms do not have
closed-form solutions. The value function with two ﬁrms and under a new












and g(y,{1,2},τ)=ω{1,2},τy,w h e r eω{1,2},τ ∈ (0,1/2) is implicitly deﬁned
by δ(1−ω{1,2},τ)=( 1−2ω{1,2},τ)
1
η. The case of the value function under the
initial agreement deﬁned by (3) is more elaborate because it combines the
four value functions. The details can be found in Appendix A.
3 The Eﬀect of Ownership Risk
Having characterized the equilibrium, we now study the eﬀect of ownership
risk on the present exploitation of the resource. To that end, we perform
a numerical analysis using the symmetric optimal extraction under the ini-
tial agreement. From Proposition 2.4, the symmetric optimal extraction is
deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to (3),
(1 − τ)q
− 1
η = δ(1 − ρ)(1 − α)ϕ{1,2},τ(y − 2q)
− 1
η + δ(1 − ρ)αϕ{1,2},τ(y − 2q)
− 1
η





evaluated at q = g(y,{1,2},τ). Each ﬁrm’s optimal extraction equates the
marginal present proﬁt of output with the discounted expected marginal
proﬁt of investment. The right-hand side of (9) has four components corre-
sponding to the four possible scenarios in the future. The ﬁrst term represents
the marginal proﬁt of investment conditional on remaining under the same
13agreement for at least one period, taking account of a possible alteration in
the agreement later on. The last three terms represent the marginal proﬁt of
investment on experiencing an alteration in the agreement regarding either
the number of active ﬁrms, or the cost of extraction rights, or both. The four
terms are discounted by δ and weighed appropriately by the probability of a
change in the agreement.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, if ownership risk aﬀects
more than one aspect of the agreement, i.e., ρ,α > 0, then the conventional
wisdom does not hold. Speciﬁcally, if the likelihood of any type of ownership
risk increases, then present extraction might decrease. We then separately
study each type of ownership risk. We ﬁrst discuss the eﬀect of uncertainty
in the cost of extraction rights when ﬁrms are certain to remain active. If
changes in the cost of extraction rights are unilateral and apply identically
to both ﬁrms, then the uncertainty in the cost of extraction rights yields
the usual eﬀect. That is, the conventional wisdom is extended to games if
the only source of risk is the cost of extraction and changes are unilateral.
We then study the eﬀect of uncertainty in the number of ﬁrms allowed to
exploit the resource when the cost of extraction rights cannot change. The
uncertainty in the number of ﬁrms alone does yield an ambiguous eﬀect.
Since, from Proposition 2.4, g(y,{1,2},τ)=ω{1,2},τy is linear in y,w e
focus on the extraction rate ω{1,2},τ. To generate the graphs, we set δ =
0.98, and consider the cases of η ∈{ 1.01,1.5,2,2.5} and (1 − τ)/(1 − τ) ∈
{1.2,1.5,2,3}.21 Note that g(y,F,τ) depends on the tax rates only through
the ratio (1 − τ)/(1 − τ).22 Here, (1 − τ)/(1 − τ) = 2 means that the active
ﬁrms would lose half of their proﬁts if the tax was changed under the new
agreement.
Our ﬁrst remark considers the full model in which both types of ownership
risk are at work, i.e., ρ,α > 0.
Remark 3.1. If ownership risk aﬀects more than one aspect of the agree-
ment, i.e., ρ,α > 0, then an increase in the likelihood of any types of risk
21The matlab codes to solve for the equilibrium and generate the graphs are available
upon request.
22See (23) and (29) in Appendix A.
14may decrease present extraction.
Remark 3.1 is illustrated in Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 in Appendix D. Consistent
with Remark 3.1, the Figures demonstrate that ownership risk has in general
ambiguous eﬀects on the extraction rate. We now study the two sources of
ownership risk separately.
3.1 Risk in the Cost of Extraction Rights
Having established that the presence of several sources of ownership risk ren-
ders the relation between ownership risk and extraction behavior ambiguous,
we now focus on the case of risk in the cost of extraction rights alone, i.e.,
ρ =0a n dα ≥ 0. From Proposition 3.2, the present exploitation increases in
the probability of a change in the division of the proﬁt which is detrimental
to the ﬁrm. The present exploitation increases in the tax levied after the
change in the agreement. Finally, the present exploitation decreases in the
present tax, i.e., the present tax is distortionary. The proof is relegated to
Appendix A.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that ρ =0and α ≥ 0.F r o m(9), g(y,{1,2},τ)
is increasing in α and τ, and decreasing in τ.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the conventional wisdom: a higher
probability of being highly taxed leads to a higher rate of extraction of the
resource (due to a lower expected proﬁt in the future). The unambiguity
of the results follows from the fact that the marginal proﬁt of investment is
decreasing in α and τ, and increasing in τ. Note that the unambiguity does
not remain if the risk of exclusion is added to the risk of a higher cost of
extraction rights. In other words, if ρ>0, ∂ω{1,2},τ/∂α cannot be signed. As
mentioned earlier, this is shown to be the case when the elasticity of demand
is low. See Figure 5.
Uncertainty only in the cost of extraction rights is analogous to what was
studied previously in the literature. The case of τ = 1 is in fact equivalent to
a nationalization of the natural resource and a full expropriation of all ﬁrms,
as in Long (1975) and Bohn and Deacon (2000). We extend the conventional
15wisdom in a game situation, i.e., a higher likelihood of a higher tax in the
future induces the ﬁrms to extract more in the present.
Remark 3.3. If changes in the cost of extraction rights are unilateral (i.e.,
apply identically to both ﬁrms), then the uncertainty in the cost of extraction
rights yields the usual eﬀect of increasing present extraction.
Proposition 3.2 and Remark 3.3 are illustrated in Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12
in Appendix D. Indeed, an increase in the likelihood of a higher cost of
extraction rights increases present extraction.
3.2 Uncertainty in the Number of Active Firms
We next consider the case of uncertainty in the number of active ﬁrms alone,
i.e., ρ ≥ 0a n dα = 0. Here, a higher probability of being excluded or
remaining the only active ﬁrm in the future has an ambiguous eﬀect on
present extraction. Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of uncertainty in the number
of active ﬁrms on present extraction rate.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that ρ ≥ 0 and α =0 .F r o m(9), ∂g(y,{1,2},τ)/∂ρ
cannot be signed.
The elasticity of demand is a key factor for explaining the behavior of
ﬁrms in face of the risk of expropriation. This is seen in Figure 1 which relates
the extraction rate under the initial agreement and the risk of exclusion. For
high values of the elasticity of demand (i.e., η = {2,2.5}), the marginal
loss of being expropriated is smaller than the marginal gain of facing less
competition, and, thus, more ownership risk leads to a decrease in present
extraction. However, for low values of the elasticity of demand, the marginal
gain of facing less competition is weakest, which induces ﬁrms to increase
extraction as ownership risk increases.23
23Note that the size of the stock does not matter for the eﬀects of ownership risk because
strategies are linear in the stock, and, thus, extraction rates are independent of the stock.
It is unclear whether the size of the stock would matter in a more general model with
nonlinear strategies. Indeed, while it is true that an increase in the stock raises the
marginal loss for being excluded, the increase in the stock should also increase the marginal





































































Figure 1: Eﬀect of ρ on Optimal Extraction Rates under α =0
Speciﬁcally, as the elasticity of demand increases, the marginal beneﬁt of
extracting today raises, inducing a ﬁrm to extract more of the resource during
the current period: it exacerbates the tragedy of the commons.24 Therefore,
in a situation of a strong tragedy of the commons (due to a high demand
elasticity), the expected gain from less competition outweighs the expected
loss from being expropriated, which decreases the present extraction of each
ﬁrm at the equilibrium.
In the case of a low elasticity of demand, we obtain the opposite eﬀect
because the tragedy of the commons is weak. Indeed, the gain from facing
less competition is not as signiﬁcant compared to the loss of being excluded.
The reasons is that a weak tragedy of the commons implies a weak dynamic
externality between ﬁrms: remaining the only active ﬁrm does not signiﬁ-
24See Koulovatianos and Mirman (2007) for the role of the elasticity of demand regarding
the eﬀect of externalities on the behavior of the ﬁrms for such a dynamic problem.
17cantly increase proﬁt (relatively to the other situation) since the externality
was weak to begin with. Thus, the marginal loss of being excluded is even-
tually higher than the marginal gain of staying the only ﬁrm in the future,
and present extraction of both ﬁrms increases at the equilibrium. These are
the mechanisms at work behind Figure 1.
A ﬁnal comment is in order. To analyze the eﬀect of ownership risk in a
common resource extraction problem,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h et w oﬁ r m s
face the same demand elasticity. As the elasticity of demand is key in de-
termining the inﬂuence of ownership risk on extraction, we discuss the case
of diﬀerent elasticities of demand. To simplify the discussion, we normalize
the cost of extraction rights to zero. Details of the extension of the model to
diﬀerent demand elasticities are relegated to Appendix B. Figures 2 and 3
show that our results are robust to diﬀerent elasticities of demand. In par-
ticular, Figure 2 provides information about the eﬀect of an increase in the
probability of exclusion on the extraction rate of ﬁrm 1, ω1. Speciﬁcally, it
shows a contour plot of the derivative of the extraction rate of ﬁrm 1 with
respect to ρ. An increase in the elasticity of demand in the market supplied
by ﬁrm 1 unambiguously decreases the extraction rate of ﬁrm 1. The eﬀect
of η2 on the extraction rate of ﬁrm 1 is ambiguous. For low values of η1,a n
increase in η2 increases the extraction rate of ﬁrm 1. For high values of η1,a n
increase in η2 decreases the extraction rate of ﬁrm 1. While Figure 2 isolates
the inﬂuence of the elasticities of demand on one ﬁrm, Figure 3 provides a
general view of the eﬀect of the demand elasticities on the overall extrac-
tion rate, ω1 + ω2. Consistent with our previous discussion, higher values of
elasticities of demand imply a negative eﬀect of the risk of exclusion on the
overall extraction rate.
4F i n a l R e m a r k s
In this paper, ownership risk is shown to have an ambiguous eﬀect on ex-
traction in a common-resource dynamic game. In particular, if ownership
risk includes a risk of expropriation in which the identities of the excluded
ﬁrms are unknown ex ante, then the present extraction of all the ﬁrms may
18decrease along with a higher risk of expropriation. The elasticity of demand
for the resource is key in explaining the eﬀect of ownership risk on present
extraction. While we have adopted a speciﬁc form to study the ambiguous
eﬀect of ownership risk on present extraction, the intuition behind our main
result seems to be quite robust.
We now discuss some of our assumptions. First, we have ignored the in-
teraction of the two ﬁrms in the market. Focusing on the dynamic interaction
only (through the extraction of the resource) allows for a clearer statement of
the mechanism at work. In fact, introducing a duopolistic market increases
the magnitude of the eﬀect of ownership risk on present extraction behav-
ior. To see this, we provide a formal treatment in Appendix C. Speciﬁcally,
Figure 4 shows the eﬀect of ownership risk on extraction for both monopoly
and duopoly in the resale market. The dotted line refers to the monopoly
case, as in the body of the paper. The solid line refers to duopoly in the re-
sale market. From Figure 4, the interaction between both ﬁrms in the resale
market reinforces the negative eﬀect of ownership risk on present extraction
rates. Indeed, in the case of both market and dynamic externalities, the
threat of excluding one ﬁrm weakens competition not only in the extraction
of the resource, but also in the sale of the resource. Hence, adding strategic
interaction in the resale market increases the expected gain from less com-
petition. Moreover, from Figure 4, the extraction rate always decreases with
the risk of expropriation, irrespective of the elasticity of the demand. The
reason is that the gain of being alone in both extracting and selling the re-
source outweighs the loss of being excluded even for small values of demand
elasticity. Interestingly, for high values of the elasticity of demand and the
likelihood of risk of expropriation, the extraction rate of a duopoly converges
to the extraction rate of our benchmark monopoly, i.e., two ﬁrms interacting
in the resale market may become almost as conservative as two monopolies.25
Second, we have assumed that the remaining ﬁrm cannot capture the
market of the excluded ﬁrm. Suppose it could, then the ambiguous eﬀect
25A perfectly competitive resale market would strengthen the tragedy of the commons as
ﬁrms extract more in the present. Consistent with our explanation, a strong tragedy of the
commons (due to perfect competition) should imply an extraction rate that is decreasing
with the risk of exclusion.
19would remain because the beneﬁt from facing less competition would be
further enhanced, i.e., future proﬁts would come from two markets instead
of one in the case of the other ﬁrm being excluded.
Third, the assumption of a one-time change is merely for simplicity. The
ambiguity of the eﬀect of ownership risk on extraction is likely to remain
and is not necessarily weakened if the agreement is subject to more changes,
i.e., with a richer structure of ownership risk. Indeed, while the gains of
facing less competition might be reduced (as there would still exist a threat of
subsequent exclusions), the loss from being excluded the ﬁrst time should also
be reduced since the presently excluded ﬁrm could also have the possibility of
being allowed back to extract the resource in future. Using a richer structure
of ownership risk to study the eﬀect of ownership risk on extraction would
be very interesting for future research.
Fourth, we study the relationship between ownership risk and extraction
behavior in an economy with only two ﬁrms. Adding more ﬁrms alters this
relationship depending on the type of risk the ﬁrms faced. The results will
then depend on the initial number of ﬁrms and the relative size of the group
to be excluded. For instance, if a large number of ﬁrm are at risk of being
excluded, then it will have a strong eﬀect on both the marginal loss of being
excluded as well as the marginal gain of facing less competition, and our
results are very likely to hold. However, if many ﬁrms are present to extract
the resource, but only one of them is at risk to be excluded, then an increase
in ownership risk should have a minimal impact on both the marginal loss
of being excluded and the marginal gain of facing less competition, and, in
turn, should lead to a small change in extraction behavior.
Finally, we consider an exogenous agreement. Our purpose was to show
that there exists types of agreement leading to an ambiguous eﬀect of own-
ership risk on extraction behavior. Whether these agreements and changes
are the ones a government would implement to achieve a particular objec-
tive such as avoiding the tragedy of the commons was outside the scope of
this paper, but is certainly important work for future research. Indeed, if
we modeled how the government decides the timing and the identities of the
excluded ﬁrms, then ownership risk would be endogenized. While we show
20that ownership risk can have an ambiguous impact for a wide range of prob-
abilities of ownership risk (the pair of α and ρ), it would be interesting to
study whether the interaction of the government with the ﬁrms would yield
ownership risk, which, in turn, would induce ﬁrms to reduce extraction. This
is likely possible if the government needs to contract with several ﬁrms (ca-
pacity constraints on the part of the ﬁrm), but is concerned with reducing
the tragedy of the commons.
21AP r o o f s
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . 4 . We ﬁrst derive the value functions and strate-
gies corresponding to (4), after the change in the agreement. In order
to combine the three cases {F,τ} = {{1,2},τ}, {F,τ} = {{j},τ},a n d
{F,τ} = {{j},τ}, we solve the problem for N ∈{ 1,2} symmetric ﬁrms.
Plugging the conjecture Vj(y,F,τ)=ϕF,τy
1− 1








































































where ωF,τ is deﬁned by (13). Here, (13) and (16) characterize ωF,τ. Specif-










22Therefore, equating expressions (16) and (17) yields an implicit characteri-
zation of ωF,τ ∈ (0,1/N), i.e.,
δ + δ(1 − N)ωF,τ =( 1− NωF,τ)
1
η. (18)
Plotting the left and right-hand sides of (18) shows that ωF,τ ∈ (0,1/N)e x -
ists and is unique, which implies that (16) is unique and the conjecture of the
value function is correct. Moreover, the second-order condition holds. There-
fore, for {F,τ} = {{1,2},τ}, {F,τ} = {{j},τ},a n d{F,τ} = {{j},τ},t h e
value function and the optimal strategy are deﬁned by (5) and (6), respec-
tively.
Having derived the value functions under the new agreement, we can
now derive the value function corresponding to (3), prior to the change in
the agreement, i.e., {F,τ} = {{1,2},τ}. Plugging into (3) the conjecture
Vj(y,{1,2},τ)=ϕ{1,2},τy
1− 1
η and the known value function Vj(y,F,τ)c o r -






j + δ(1 − ρ)(1 − α)ϕ{1,2},τ(y − qj − qk)
1− 1
η
+ δ(1 − ρ)αϕ{1,2},τ(y − qj − qk)
1− 1
η + δρ(1 − α)ϕ{j},τ(y − qj − qk)
1− 1
η/2
+ δραϕ{j},τ(y − qj − qk)
1− 1
η/2, (19)
where ϕ{1,2},τ is unknown at this point, but ϕ{1,2},τ, ϕ{j},τ,a n dϕ{j},τ are






(1 − ρ)(1 − α)ϕ{1,2},τ +( 1− ρ)αϕ{1,2},τ
+ρ(1 − α)ϕ{j},τ/2+ραϕ{j},τ/2
	
(y − qj − qk)
− 1
η, (20)





2(1 − τ)η + δη((1 − ρ)(1 − α)ϕ{1,2},τ +Δ ) η, (22)
23where
Δ=( 1− ρ)αϕ{1,2},τ + ρ(1 − α)ϕ{j},τ/2+ραϕ{j},τ/2 (23)
























{1,2},τ + δΔ(1 − 2ω{1,2},τ)
1− 1
η




where ω{1,2},τ is deﬁned by (22). Here, (22) and (26) characterize ω{1,2},τ.
Speciﬁcally, solving (22) for ϕ{1,2},τ yields
ϕ{1,2},τ =
1 − τ








(1 − ρ)(1 − α)
. (27)
Therefore, equating expressions (26) and (27) yields an implicit characteri-




{1,2},τ + δΔ(1 − 2ω{1,2},τ)
1− 1
η























where Δ is deﬁned by (23). Plotting the left and right-hand sides of (29)
shows that ω{1,2},τ ∈ (0,1/2) exists and is unique, which implies that (26) is
unique and that the conjecture of the value function is correct. Moreover, the
second-order condition holds. Therefore, for {F,τ} = {{1,2},τ}, the value
24function and the optimal strategy are deﬁned by (5) and (6), respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Since g(y,{1,2},τ)=ω{1,2},τy, it is enough
to calculate the derivative of ω{1,2},τ with respect to α, τ,a n dτ.I f ρ =0
and α ≥ 0, then, from (8), (23), and (29), ω{1,2},τ is implicitly deﬁned by
















where, using (18), ω{1,2},τ is implicitly deﬁned by
δ(1 − ω{1,2},τ)=( 1− 2ω{1,2},τ)
1
η. (31)
Here, the left-hand side of (30) is increasing in ω{1,2},τ and the right-hand
side of (30) is decreasing in ω{1,2},τ. First, the derivative of the left-hand side













{1,2},τ < 0, (32)
which is always negative for ω{1,2},τ ∈ [0,1/2]. Thus, the left-hand side of (30)
decreases in α, implying that ω{1,2},τ increases in α. Second, if τ increases,
then the left-hand side of (30) decreases, implying that ω{1,2},τ increases in
τ. Finally, if τ increases, then the left-hand side of (30) increases, implying
that ω{1,2},τ decreases in τ.
B Diﬀerent Demand Elasticities
We now consider the case of diﬀerent demand elasticity, i.e., η1  = η2.T o
simplify the discussion, we normalize the cost of extraction rights to zero.






j + δ(1 − ρ)Vj(y − qj − qk,{1,2})














The conjecture for (33) is Vj(y,{1,2})=ϕjy
1− 1
ηj , ϕj > 0. Plugging the






j + δ(1 − ρ)ϕj(y − qj − qk)
1− 1
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+ δρ(1 − δ
ηj)
− 1
ηj (y − qj − qk)
1− 1
ηj /2. (35)
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26Solving (38) for ϕj yields
ϕj =




















j + δ(1 − ρ)ϕj(1 − ωj − ωk)
1− 1
ηj
+ δρ(1 − δ
ηj)
− 1















j + δρ(1 − δηj)
− 1
ηj (1 − ωj − ωk)
1− 1
ηj /2




Combining (39) and (42) for j =1 ,2 yields a nonlinear system in ω1 and ω2:
















1 + δρ(1 − δη1)
− 1
η1(1 − ω1 − ω2)
1− 1
η1/2






















2 + δρ(1 − δη2)
− 1
η2(1 − ω2 − ω1)
1− 1
η2/2














1 =2 ( 1− δ
η1)
1









2 =2 ( 1− δ
η2)
1
η2δ(1 − ρ)(1 − ω1). (46)
Expressions (45) and (46) are solved to generate Figures 2 and 3. To generate



































































































































We now study the eﬀect of market structure by extending the benchmark
monopoly model to duopoly. To simplify the discussion, we normalize the
cost of extraction rights to zero. Hence, analogous to (3), the value function






j +( 1− γ)(qj + qk)
− 1
ηqj + δ(1 − ρ)Vj(y − qj − qk,{1,2})
+ δρVj(y − qj − qk,{j})/2, (47)
where γ ∈{ 0,1}. Expression (47) combines the two cases at study, i.e.,
γ = 1 refers to monopoly while γ = 0 refers to duopoly. Using (7) evaluated













The conjecture for (47) is Vj(y,{1,2})=ϕDy
1− 1
η, ϕD > 0.26 Plugging the






j +( 1− γ)(qj + qk)
− 1
ηqj + δ(1 − ρ)ϕD(y − qj − qk)
1− 1
η
+ δρ(1 − δ
η)
− 1
η(y − qj − qk)
1− 1
η/2. (49)
































(y − qj − qk)
− 1
η, (50)
so that, given the conjecture, the symmetric Cournot-Nash solution is
gD(y,{1,2})=ωDy, (51)













































































































































































When γ = 1, expression (57) simpliﬁes to
2(1 − 2ωD)
1



















































Figure 4: Comparison between Monopoly and Duopoly


































Expressions (58) and (59) are solved to generate Figure 4.27 Speciﬁcally,
Figure 4 provide the eﬀect of ownership risk on extraction for both monopoly
and duopoly in the resale market. The dotted line refers to the monopoly
case, as in the body of the paper. The solid line refers to duopoly in the
resale market.
27To generate the graphs, we set δ =0 .98, and consider the cases of η ∈{ 1.01,1.5,2,2.5}
and ρ ∈ [0,1].
31DF i g u r e s
Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 provide a contour plot of the extraction rate ω{1,2},τ
of the stock exploited under the initial agreement for all possible values
of ρ and α, and under diﬀerent values of the elasticity of demand (η =
{1.01,1.5,2,2.5}) and the cost of extraction rights. Speciﬁcally, given a spe-
ciﬁc elasticity of demand and cost of extraction rights, a graph represents
the diﬀerent extraction rates chosen by a ﬁrm under diﬀerent risky situa-
tions, i.e., diﬀerent pairs of ρ and α. A curve in the graph reads similarly as
an indiﬀerence curve in a utility graph: it represents the set of probabilities
yielding the same extraction rate. The relative bending of the curves provides
information about the marginal rate of substitution or complementarity be-
tween the risk of a higher cost of extraction rights and the risk of exclusion.
If a curve is downward sloping, it means that the extraction rate is increasing
in both sources of risk: in order to keep the same extraction rate, one should
diminish one risk to compensate for the increase in the other risk. If a curve
is upward sloping, it means that the probability of being expropriated leads
to a lower extraction rate, while the risk of being more taxed in the future
has the opposite eﬀect, i.e., extraction rate is increased. The more bent a
curve is, the stronger the substitution or complementarity patterns are.
Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 isolates the eﬀect of the risk of a higher cost of



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 12: Eﬀect of α on Optimal Extraction Rates under ρ =0a n dη =2 .5
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